Resumen:El objetivo de este artículo es analizar la disputa en torno a las ciencias sociales de Theodor Adorno y Karl Popper de 1961, publicada en el libro La disputa del positivismo en la sociología alemana. Los ejes del análisis son: Qué es la ciencia, cuál es su método. Para cumplir el objetivo, explicitaremos cada uno de los puntos antes mencionados, para luego, en una tercera etapa contrastar las aproximaciones de ambos autores. En las conclusiones se discuten las posibles derivas políticas (...) a las cuales conducen las concepciones de los autores.Palabras clave: conocimiento; ciencia; método; sociología; valores. (shrink)

En su encierro durante la II Guerra Mundial, Althusser, según declaró, solamente tuvo al alcance un libro: los Pensées de Pascal, un clásico que, tras la reflexión religiosa, también planteó problemas epistemológicos, históricos y sociológicos de tal manera que en él se pueden encontrar rasgos “profundamente materialistas”. [1] La influencia de Pascal es expresa, cuando Althusser recoge la parábola de la conversión religiosa para explicar (insuficientemente) el fenómeno de la interpelación ideológica. Pero los textos de Pascal contienen intuiciones que sobrepasan (...) los límites de la teoría althusseriana y que se pueden rastrear a la luz de la teoría psicoanalítica de la ideología tal como ésta es elaborada por los autores de la escuela eslovena. [1] L. Althusser: Filosofía y marxismo. Entrevista por Fernanda Navarro , Madrid, Siglo XXI, 1988, pp. 46-47. (shrink)

_"A stimulating history of how the imagination interacted with its sibling psychological faculties—emotion, perception and reason—to shape the history of human mental life."—_The __Wall Street Journal__ To imagine—to see what is not there—is the startling ability that has fueled human development and innovation through the centuries. As a species we stand alone in our remarkable capacity to refashion the world after the picture in our minds. Traversing the realms of science, politics, religion, culture, philosophy, and history, Felipe Fernández-Armesto reveals (...) the thrilling and disquieting tales of our imaginative leaps—from the first _Homo sapiens_ to the present day. Through groundbreaking insights in cognitive science, Fernández-Armesto explores how and why we have ideas in the first place, providing a tantalizing glimpse into who we are and what we might yet accomplish. Unearthing historical evidence, he begins by reconstructing the thoughts of our Paleolithic ancestors to reveal the subtlety and profundity of the thinking of early humans. A masterful paean to the human imagination from a wonderfully elegant thinker, _Out of Our Minds_ shows that bad ideas are often more influential than good ones; that the oldest recoverable thoughts include some of the best; that ideas of Western origin often issued from exchanges with the wider world; and that the pace of innovative thinking is under threat. (shrink)

According to robust versions of virtue epistemology, the reason why knowledge is incompatible with certain kinds of luck is that justified true beliefs must be achieved by the agent . In a recent set of papers, Pritchard has challenged these sorts of views, advancing different arguments against them. I confront one of them here, which is constructed upon scenarios affected by environmental luck, such as the fake barn cases. My objection to Pritchard differs from those offered until now by Carter (...) , Jarvis or Littlejohn in that it is based on the claim that cognitive performances may not be properly considered as achievements beyond the scope of the agent’s intentional action—an idea that confers more explanatory power on my argument, and contributes to stregthening links between knowledge and agency. (shrink)

This paper advances new theses about the relationship between luck and risk, using recent work by Duncan Pritchard (2014, 2015, 2016) as its foil. Once Pritchard’s views are introduced in section 1, the rest of the paper completes two different tasks, one critical and one constructive. By focussing on some epistemological cases that Pritchard’s model would fail to identify, section 2 shows that it relies on a difference that is in fact inessential: the one between the occurrence and the non‐occurrence (...) of an event. Section 3 sketches and defends an alternative account of the luck/risk distinction, based on the consideration of situations (instead of events) from different temporal perspectives: luck assessments track a situation’s past, considering it the actual outcome of some previous event, whereas risk assessments look at the situation’s future, regarding it as the initial condition of some unsettled event. (shrink)

In a series of recent papers, Ben Bramble defends a version of hedonism which holds that purely repetitious pleasures add no value to one’s life (i.e. Non-Repeatable Hedonism). In this paper, we pose a dilemma for Non-Repeatable Hedonism. We argue that it is either committed both to a deeply implausible asymmetry between how pleasures and pains affect a person’s well-being and to deeply implausible claims about how to maximize well-being, or is committed to the claim that a life of eternal (...) pleasure for a person can be just as good for them as a life of eternal suffering. The only way out of this dilemma is for Bramble to reject the Non-Repetition Requirement. Yet, rejecting this requirement both forces Bramble to reject the wholly unique, core component, of his view and undermines his view’s ability to handle one of the most powerful objections to hedonism, viz., that a life with a larger quantity of so-called “base” (or lower) pleasures is better for a person than a life with a slightly smaller quantity of so-called higher pleasures. We conclude that Non-Repeatable Hedonism must be rejected in favor of standard forms of hedonism or some non-hedonic view of well-being. (shrink)

We live in an era where our health is linked to that of others across the globe, and nothing brings this home better than the specter of a pandemic. This paper explores the findings of town hall meetings associated with the Canadian Program of Research on Ethics in a Pandemic , in which focus groups met to discuss issues related to the global governance of an influenza pandemic. Two competing discourses were found to be at work: the first was based (...) upon an economic rationality and the second upon a humanitarian rationality. The implications for public support and the long-term sustainability of new global norms, networks, and regulations in global public health are discussed. (shrink)

In this essay we argue that the notion of machine necessarily includes its being designed for a purpose. Therefore, being a mechanical system is not enough for being a machine. Since the experimental scientific method excludes any consideration of finality on methodological grounds, it is then also insufficient to fully understand what machines are. Instead in order to understand a machine it is first required to understand its purpose, along with its structure, in clear parallel with Aristotle’s final and formal (...) causes. Obviously, purpose and structure are not machine components that can physically interact with other components; nonetheless they are essential to understanding their operation. This casts an interesting light on the relationship between mind and body: for just as an artifact’s finality and structure explain its operation, so also consciousness is the explanation—not the efficient cause—of specifically human behavior. What machines and human beings have in common is that, in order to understand them, it is necessary to appeal to the principle of finality. Yet while finality is given and extrinsic in the case of machines, we human beings are characterized by the ability to self-propose our own ends. Since the principle of finality is essential to understanding the production of machines, the traditional view in modern Western philosophy that finality lies beyond the scope of objective/scientific knowledge should be rectified to allow for a genuine science of the artificial. We think a correct understanding of final causality will overcome current resistance to this principle. (shrink)

It is generally accepted that, around the turn of the century, GIBBS and EINSTEIN independently developed two equivalent formulations of statistical mechanics. GIBBS version is taken as genuine and rigorous, while EINSTEINs, despite some features which are characteristic of him, is usually considered a not totally satisfactory attempt.It will be shown in the present work that such a picture is oversimplified and requires further nuancing. In fact, there are significant differences, with important implications which have not been sufficiently examined, between (...) the two formulations. Several issues relating to the impact of the two versions will also be addressed. (shrink)

Historical accounts of the work of J. J. Thomson find a contradiction in his work. On the one hand, he is presented as a Maxwellian theoretical physicist dealing with a typically Victorian entity, the ether. On the other hand, the analysis of his experimental work at the Cavendish seems to have little connection with his mathematical work. In this paper, I discuss the metaphysical views of J. J. Thomson, and argue that his deep belief in the ultimate continuity of matter (...) can be seen to give a framework to both his theoretical and his experimental work. His metaphysical beliefs were not in the least shaken by the discovery of discrete phenomena and entities, not even by his suggestion of the existence of corpuscles later known as electrons. His formation in Cambridge, together with some ideas that he acquired in his youth at Owens College, Manchester, are the key to understanding his metaphysics and the role it plays in his scientific work. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como propósito presentar una reflexión pedagógica mediante la aplicación de referentes del pensamiento de Juan José Bautista, discípulo de Enrique Dussel. Se busca repensar en términos epistemológicos la enseñanza del locus de enunciación latinoamericano. Se tiene en cuenta que el proceso de desarrollo y consolidación de la razón moderna como forma de compresión de la realidad latinoamericana ha destruido sistemáticamente otras formas de pensar, incluidas las de los pueblos originarios americanos. Es por eso que este artículo (...) busca introducir la reflexión sobre los compromisos que implican pensar y pertenecer a esta zona geográficamente diversa. (shrink)

Nowadays philosophy is characterized by such heterogeneous intellectual practices that its very unity and coherence seem endangered. What is especially disconcerting is that most authors manage to largely ignore the very existence of methodological positions radically different from their own. Fortunately, there have been exceptions, and the present volume focuses on one of them: the failed debate that took place between John Searle and Jacques Derrida. -/- This book thoroughly analyses that exchange, contextualizing it within the respective philosophical traditions of (...) the two thinkers, with the general aim of turning their dispute into what it was not: a respectful, sensible and fruitful controversy. This episode is thus taken as an opportunity to reflect on the peculiar nature of philosophy as an intellectual practice, and to discuss some of its main themes: language as an instrument for communication, the intentionality of consciousness, and difference as a constitutive element of every text. (shrink)

Within New Testament writings, but in a special way in Paul’s letters, we can observe a significant presence of the greek term parresía, or frank language. This term was not only a rhetorical-linguistic instrument, on Paul’s contemporary time, but an attitude made by the speaker, or by the epistolar author before his recipients. On Eph 6,19, we see this term and its relation with the evangelizing mission of the author. Moreover, this concept was not only a linguistic function for Paul’s (...) writings and time actions, but it can have an effectiveness in present time. (shrink)

In his influential paper Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps' reprinted in The Authority of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), Raz says that legal gaps only exist when law speaks with uncertain voice or when it speaks with many voices, but there are no gaps when law is silent. In this later case, rules of closure, which are analytically true, prevent from the occurrence of gaps. According to Raz, if there is a gap in a legal system, then both the (...) claim that there is a conclusive legal reason to perform a certain action, and its negation are neither true nor false. Therefore, one of the Raz's most important contributions to the solution of the problem of legal gaps is to remark that legal discourse is not altogether governed by the principle of bivalence. However, philosophers often claim that the denial of bivalence leads to a logical inconsistency. If this claim were true, then Raz's solution to the problem of gaps would be seriously threatened. In this paper we show ‐ with the aid of a sophisticated analytical tool, i.e. von Wright's Truth Logic ‐ that the rejection of bivalence only commits us to accept the trivial conclusion that propositions can lack truth‐values. For this reason, Raz's paper can still be regarded as a good starting‐point for analyzing the relationships among norms, practical reasoning and legal gaps. However, we also show that in order to admit propositions which are neither true nor false, Raz's theses must be reformulated. Otherwise, the claim that there is no gap when law is silent would not be compatible with the rejection of bivalence. (shrink)

Based on the work done in [][] in the o‐minimal and geometric settings, we study expansions of models of a supersimple theory with a new predicate distiguishing a set of forking‐independent elements that is dense inside a partial type, which we call H‐structures. We show that any two such expansions have the same theory and that under some technical conditions, the saturated models of this common theory are again H‐structures. We prove that under these assumptions the expansion is supersimple and (...) characterize forking and canonical bases of types in the expansion. We also analyze the effect these expansions have on one‐basedness and CM‐triviality. In the one‐based case, when T has SU‐rank and the SU‐rank is continuous, we take to be the type of elements of SU‐rank and we describe a natural “geometry of generics modulo H” associated with such expansions and show it is modular. (shrink)

Entre los muchos aspectos por los cuales se conoce la filosofía de Hegel, la caracterización y defensa que este realiza de una monarquía constitucional hereditaria en sus _Principios de la Filosofía del Derecho_, ha sido, sin duda alguna, uno de los temas más discutidos. En consideración del amplio conflicto entre posturas, enfoques e interpretaciones de diversa índole, así como de la dificultad que encarnan muchas de las afirmaciones de Hegel al respecto, puede afirmarse que el problema sobre el verdadero sentido (...) o el significado de la monarquía en su filosofía continúa en muchos aspectos aún sin resolverse. El propósito de este escrito no consiste en hacer una reconstrucción de las más importantes interpretaciones, sino, más bien, en identificar cuáles son las perspectivas o modelos de análisis más importantes que han estado a su base. Ello, con el fin de contrastarlas directamente con las propias advertencias metodológicas de Hegel en su obra y justificar, a partir de allí, la necesidad de priorizar y dar un mayor desarrollo a una perspectiva y forma específica de abordar el problema. Al final, se ofrecerán algunas consideraciones y sugerencias metodológicas para la realización de un análisis tal, que pudieran ayudar a encontrar nuevas respuestas o elementos de interpretación al respecto. (shrink)

Aus dem Inhalt: Die Wissenschaftslehre als System der unvollendeten Vollendung. - Fichtes Wechselwirkung und der implizite Hoerer der Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo. - Die Begrenzung: vom Anstoss zur Aufforderung. - Die Idee des Leibes im Jenaer System. - Fichtes politische und Rechtsphilosophie in der Deutung Richard Schottkys. - Gibt es bei Fichte eine transzendentale Anthropologie?.

The way we live - our manners, morals, habits, experiences, relationships, technology, values - are changing ever faster and faster than ever. The effects can be dislocating, baffling, sometimes terrifying. Why? How can we get off the whirligig? Felipe Fernández-Armesto explores the evidence and offers answers. Combining insights from history, biology, anthropology, archaeology, philosophy, sociology, ethology, zoology, primatology, psychology, linguistics cognitive sciences, and even business studies, he argues that culture is exempt from evolution. No environmental conditions, no genetic legacy, (...) no predictable patterns, no scientific laws determine our behaviour. We can make and remake our world in the freedom of unconstrained imaginations. (shrink)

You think you're human. But what does that mean? How can humanity be defined? Felipe Fernandez-Armesto takes us on an enlightening and provocative journey through the history of humankind to reveal the challenges to our most fundamental belief - that we are, and have always been, human. Fernandez-Armesto investigates advances in artificial intelligence and genetics, and asks what these mean for the future of human values, human rights, and the defence of human dignity. The book illustrates how our concept (...) of humankind has changed over time and how our current understanding of this has been shaken by new challenges from science and philosophy. (shrink)

The word έρμηνϵία (ermeneia) means expression and interpretation of a thought, from which the word “hermeneutics” comes. Some authors maintain that the name of the Greek god Hermes subsequently came from the same root. Hermes was the brother of Apollo and Athene and the son of Zeus and Maia, from which it could be deduced that he is paired by family lineage with images of light on the one hand and darkness and opacity on the other. Both metaphors remind us (...) that the expression and interpretation of thoughts may follow either a rational or an irrational order. The fact that most authors agree that it was after the expansion of Greek culture that the problem of interpretation acquired such marked prominence gives us an idea of the connection between hermeneutics and otherness. (shrink)

ArgumentThe discovery of electron diffraction by George Paget Thomson in Aberdeen and Clinton J. Davisson and Lester H. Germer at the Bell Labs has often been portrayed as an example of independent discovery. Neither team was particularly interested in the developments of the nascent quantum theory but they both ended up demonstrating one of the most striking experimental consequences of the new physics. This paper traces the aftermath of this discovery and the way electron diffraction immediately turned from empirical evidence (...) of a highly novel theory into a technique for applied and technological research. Thomson was the first to design an “electron diffraction camera,” an instrument that soon found its place in laboratories around the world. I discuss the role played by Davisson and Germer, and by Thomson in the development of electron diffraction as a “research technology,” taking into account their specific institutional settings and research cultures. While Davisson and Germer remained in the industry-oriented Bell Labs, Thomson moved to Imperial College in 1930 where collaboration first, and competition later with George I. Finch was also relevant for the consolidation of an instrument that eventually became widely known as the “Finch Camera.”. (shrink)

Este trabajo analiza los aspectos más destacados de la polémica entre Juan Carlos Bayón y Eugenio Bulygin acerca de las lagunas jurídicas, el principio de prohibición y el alcance de la discreción judicial. En esta disputa, Bulygin defiende cuatro tesis centrales, enunciadas en Normative Systems : una cuidadosa distinción entre normas y proposiciones normativas es esencial para resolver el problema de las lagunas jurídicas, la versión débil del principio de prohibición no sirve para mostrar que no existen lagunas, la versión (...) fuerte del principio de prohibición es verdadera solo cuando el sistema es completo, y en casos de lagunas jurídicas, los jueces tienen discreción para resolver estas situaciones. Sin embargo, Bayón señala que el problema no es la falta de distinción entre normas y proposiciones normativas sino el desacuerdo acerca de cuándo una solución jurídica es concluyente. La diferencia entre soluciones prima facie y concluyente es esencial porque en ciertas situaciones, el derecho no da una respuesta pero tampoco deja espacio para la discrecionalidad judicial. Según Bayón, en estos casos el principio de prohibición "todo lo que no está prohibido está permitido" juega un papel fundamental. Este trabajo muestra que los argumentos de Bayón son insuficientes para rechazar las tesis clásicas defendidas por Bulygin. In this paper I analyze the most relevant aspects of the controversy between Juan Carlos Bayón and Eugenio Bulygin about the existence of legal gaps, the so called "principle of prohibition" and the scope of judicial discretion. In this debate, Bulygin defends four classical theses advanced in his wellknown book, Normative Systems : a careful distinction between norms and norm propositions is actually needed in order to solve the problem of legal gaps, the analytical truth of the weak version of the principle of prohibition cannot guarantee the completeness of legal systems, the strong version of the principle of prohibition is true only if legal systems are complete, and judges have discretion in cases of legal gaps. However, Bayón claims that the problem is not the lack of distinction between norms and norm proposition but rather the identification of conclusive legal solutions. Conclusive legal solutions must be distinguished from the prima facie solutions provided by explicitly enacted norms. According to Bayón, the difference between conclusive and prima facie solutions is essential in legally irrelevant cases; in such cases the principle of prohibition plays an essential role because it entails the rejection of judicial discretion. In this paper I claim that the arguments advanced by Bayón fail to provide a sound ground for discarding the classical theses defended by Bulygin. (shrink)